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Abstract
The philosophical debate about quantum logic between the late
1960s and the early 1980s was generated mainly by Putnam’s claims
that quantum mechanics empirically motivates introducing a new form
of logic, that such an empirically founded quantum logic is the ‘true’
logic, and that adopting quantum logic would resolve all the para-
doxes of quantum mechanics. Most of that debate focussed on the
latter claim, reaching the conclusion that it was mistaken. This chap-
ter will attempt to clarify the possible misunderstandings surrounding
the more radical claims about the revision of logic, assessing them in
particular both in the context of more general quantum-like theories
(in the framework of von Neumann algebras), and against the back-
ground of the current state of play in the philosophy and interpretation
of quantum mechanics. Characteristically, the conclusions that might
be drawn depend crucially on which of the currently proposed solutions
to the measurement problem is adopted.
1 Introduction
In 1968 Hilary Putnam published a well-known paper on the question ‘Is
logic empirical?’ (Putnam 1968), which gave rise to much controversy in
the 1970s and 1980s. The main claims of Putnam’s paper (repeated in
Putnam 1974) can be paraphrased as follows:
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(a) Quantum mechanics prompts us to revise our classical logical no-
tions in favour of ‘quantum logical’ ones. This is explained by analogy to
geometry, in the sense that also general relativity prompts us to revise our
Euclidean (or rather Minkowskian) geometrical notions in favour of Rieman-
nian (or rather pseudo-Riemannian) geometrical notions.
(b) This revision of logic is not merely local, i. e. not merely an instance
of a logical system especially suited to a particular subject matter, but it is
truly global. Quantum logic is the ‘true’ logic (just as the ‘true’ geometry
of space-time is non-Euclidean). Indeed, we have so far failed to recognise
that our usual logical connectives are the connectives of quantum logic.
(c) Recognising that logic is thus quantum solves the standard paradoxes
of quantum mechanics, such as the measurement problem or Schro¨dinger’s
cat.
Of these truly ambitious and indeed exciting claims, the third claim
(c) in particular was discussed extensively, and an almost universal consen-
sus was reached (now shared by Putnam, 1994) that a move to quantum
logic, even were it otherwise justified, would not resolve the puzzles of quan-
tum mechanics. There have been notable reactions also to Putnam’s first
two claims. Yet, with few exceptions (one needs only to recall the mas-
terly paper by Michael Dummett, 1976), the topic seems to be riddled with
misunderstandings. Indeed, very few philosophers appear to still consider
seriously the possibility that quantum mechanics might have something to
say about the ‘true’ logic (I know of only one recent attempt to resurrect
this idea, namely by Michael Dickson, 2001, on whose views more below).
This chapter aims at clearing such misunderstandings, and at providing a
much-needed overall assessment of Putnam’s claims, by updating the debate
in the light of the current state of the art in the foundations of quantum
mechanics.
As regards Putnam’s claim (a), I take it that it is indeed justified, at least
provided one takes ‘quantum logic’ as a local logic, suitable to describing a
class of propositions in the context of quantum mechanical experiments (or
the corresponding class of propositions about properties of quantum me-
chanical systems). This claim is analogous to the claim that intuitionistic
logic is indeed suitable to describing a class of propositions dealing with
mathematical constructions. This is distinct from the claim that intuition-
istic logic is in fact the logic that underlies all rigorous human thought (and
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is thus the ‘true’ logic). Claim (a) understood in this sense, I should think, is
relatively uncontroversial, and shall be taken as such for purposes of further
discussion. The explanation that quantum logic, suitably defined, has all
the main formal properties required of a ‘good’ logic will also fall into this
part of the discussion.
Claim (b) is the most controversial one, and its assessment will therefore
need the most care. There are two points at issue (both well emphasised
already by Dummett). The first point is that motivating a revision of logic
does not only require motivating the introduction of some non-classical con-
nectives. An advocate of a revision of logic must show why these connectives
do not merely sit alongside the classical connectives, but actually replace
them. The second point is a Quinean one: such a revision of logic means
that, as part of the various revisions to our network of beliefs prompted by
the empirical consideration of quantum phenomena, it is possible to choose
to make some revisions in our conception of logic. But it is clear that em-
pirical considerations alone cannot force us to revise our logic: a distinctly
philosophical component will be needed in order to justify whether a revision
of logic, as opposed to a revision somewhere else in our network of beliefs,
might be desirable. (In the case of geometry, this is the same situation we
have known ever since Poincare´. And indeed, we shall note in section 7
that in the interpretation of quantum mechanics one can find a rather close
analogy to issues about conventionalism in physical geometry.)
An aspect of claim (b) that is of special importance is the subsidiary
claim that the quantum logical connectives are not new connectives that
can be defined in terms of the classical ones (and of some additional phys-
ical concepts), but that the classical connectives are in fact the quantum
logical ones in disguise. We shall therefore have to discuss in depth whether
there is a sense in which the classical connectives might be reducible to the
quantum logical ones, either in some strict formal sense, or in some physical
limit. In this context, as we shall see, questions of interpretation in quan-
tum mechanics play an important role. Indeed, most discussions of quantum
logic as the ‘true’ logic have taken place, at least implicitly, in the context of
the so-called standard interpretation of quantum mechanics. This, however,
is the interpretation that is riddled with the usual paradoxes. As we shall
see, which alternative approach to the foundations of quantum mechanics
one accepts might influence the assessment of whether a global revision of
logic is acceptable. Conversely, one might add, one’s views on whether a
global revision of logic is acceptable might influence the assessment of which
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approach to the foundations of quantum mechanics is most appealing.
We shall proceed as follows. In section 2, we sketch a few basic elements
of quantum mechanics that will be needed later. In section 3, we introduce
quantum logic (in its lattice-theoretic form) as a local logic of certain experi-
mental propositions; we further discuss the formal properties of such a logic,
and mention a few alternative forms of quantum logic. Section 4 introduces
the so-called standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, and section 5
assesses Putnam’s claims in the context of this interpretation. The claims
are found hard to defend, but the standard interpretation itself is not a be-
lievable interpretation because it gives rise to the usual paradoxes, at least
if one applies it to standard quantum mechanics. Putnam’s claims are thus
reassessed first, in section 6, in the context of more general quantum-like
theories (based on von Neumann algebras), where the classical connectives
seem indeed to be reducible to the quantum ones. Then, in section 7, we
shall reassess Putnam’s claims in the context of the main current approaches
to the foundations of quantum mechanics that explicitly address the para-
doxes of the standard theory. Our conclusions will be that, while in the case
of the approaches known as de Broglie-Bohm theory and as spontaneous col-
lapse theories quantum logic at most can be introduced alongside classical
logic, and thus in no way can be construed as replacing it, in the case of
the Everett (or many-worlds) approach a case can indeed be made that the
classical connectives emerge from the quantum ones.
Before proceeding, I should emphasise that although the title of this
chapter may suggest a general treatment of the question of whether logic
is empirical, it will deal only with the question of whether considerations
related to quantum mechanics may provide an argument for the general
claim. (Putnam’s original paper (1968) does the same.1) Of course, if
quantum logic provides us with an intelligible global alternative to classical
logic, the case for logic being empirical will be strengthened. However, I
believe that a comprehensive assessment of the question of whether empirical
considerations might prompt us to revise our logic will depend less on the
details of the physics and more on the largely conceptual question of whether
the notion of logical consequence is a priori or is an abstraction from what
appear to be valid inferences in our practical use of language.2 Indeed, unless
1As a matter of fact, Putnam’s paper was later reprinted with the modified title ‘The
logic of quantum mechanics’.
2For a recent discussion of the apriorism issue in logic, see e. g. Bueno and Colyvan
(2004). Note also that one could very well conceive adopting an apriorist position with
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one tends towards the latter position, i. e. unless one thinks that classical
logic is already an abstraction from the classical empirical world around us
(thus already conceding that ‘logic is empirical’), one will be disinclined to
take discoveries in microphysics to be relevant at all to the revisability of
logic. We shall not attempt to address this more general question.
2 Quantum mechanics in a nutshell
In the interest of a self-contained presentation, I summarise a few essentials
about quantum mechanics that will be needed below. (This section will be
rather abstract but elementary.)
In classical mechanics, the state of a system can be represented by a
point in (or a subset of, or a probability distribution over) a set called phase
space, encoding the positions and momenta of all the particles forming the
system. In quantum mechanics, instead, the state of a system is represented
by an element in a complex Hilbert space (which is a vector space, equipped
with a scalar product, that is complete in the norm induced by the scalar
product). In particular, this means that for any two states (e. g., for a
spin-1/2 system, the states of spin-up and spin-down in direction x), an
arbitrary linear combination (or ‘superposition’) is also a possible state:
|ϕ〉 = α|+x〉+ β|−x〉 . (1)
Note that the same vector can always be expressed as an appropriate linear
combination of vectors in any other basis:
|ϕ〉 = γ|+y〉+ δ|−y〉 . (2)
In quantum mechanics, overall scalar factors do not count, i. e. the vec-
tors |ϕ〉 and ε|ϕ〉 for arbitrary complex ε represent the same state, and by
convention all states are usually normalised, i. e. have length 1. Therefore,
if the basis vectors are normalised and orthogonal, as in the example above,
one has |α|2 + |β|2 = |γ|2 + |δ|2 = 1.
A second crucial distinction between classical and quantum mechanics
is that, when describing composite systems in quantum mechanics, instead
regard to quantum logic rather than classical logic.
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of taking the Cartesian product of the given phase spaces as in classical
mechanics, one has to take the tensor product of the given Hilbert spaces.
For instance, for two spin-1/2 subsystems with Hilbert spaces generated
(spanned) by
{|+1x〉, |−1x〉}, {|+2x〉, |−2x〉} , (3)
one takes the Hilbert space generated by a basis given by the products of
the basis vectors:
{|+1x〉 ⊗ |+2x〉, |+1x〉 ⊗ |−2x〉, |−1x〉 ⊗ |+2x〉, |−1x〉 ⊗ |−2x〉} (4)
(this construction is independent of the bases chosen for the subsystems).
The fundamental consequence of taking tensor products to describe com-
posite systems is that some states of the composite are not product states,
e. g. the so-called singlet state of two spin-1/2 systems:
1√
2
(
|+1x〉 ⊗ |−2x〉 − |−1x〉 ⊗ |+2x〉
)
. (5)
Such non-factorisable states are called entangled (the property of being en-
tangled is also independent of the bases chosen for representation in the
component systems3). If the state of a composite system is entangled, then
the subsystems are evidently not described separately by vectors in their re-
spective Hilbert spaces. This is a characteristic trait of quantum mechanics
(Schro¨dinger, 1935, p. 555, called it ‘not .... one but rather the characteris-
tic trait of quantum mechanics’), and it is related to the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen paradox, the Bell inequalities, quantum non-locality et cetera.
How can this be? The key, and the third crucial ingredient in our brief
summary of quantum mechanics besides Hilbert spaces and tensor prod-
ucts, is the phenomenology of measurement. In classical mechanics one can
idealise measurements as testing whether a system lies in a certain subset
of its phase space. This can be done in principle without disturbing the
system, and the result of the test is in principle fully determined by the
state of the system. In quantum mechanics we are empirically confronted
with the following situation. (i) Measurements can be idealised as testing
whether the system lies in a certain (norm-closed) subspace of its Hilbert
space — a subset which, in particular, is closed under linear combinations.
(ii) A measurement in general disturbs a system: unless the state of the
3Incidentally, it is not independent on the choice of the subsystems into which the
system is decomposed.
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system is either contained in or orthogonal to the tested subspace, the state
is projected (‘collapsed’) onto either the tested subspace or its orthogonal
complement. (c) This collapse process is indeterministic, and the relevant
probabilities are given by the squared norms of the projections of the state
on the given subspace and its orthogonal complement, respectively.
For example, take the initial state (1) and test for spin-up in direction
x (test for the subspace P+x): the final state will be |+x〉 with probability
|α|2, or |−x〉 with probability |β|2. Now take the singlet state (5) as the
intial state and test for P 1+x ⊗ P 2+x : the test will come out negative with
probability 1, and the state will be undisturbed, since it lies in a subspace
orthogonal to the tested one. (The same will be the case if one tests for
P 1−x ⊗ P 2−x .) Test instead for P 1+x ⊗ P 2−x (or for P 1−x ⊗ P 2+x): the result (in
both cases) will now be |+1x〉 ⊗ |−2x〉 or |−1x〉 ⊗ |+2x〉, each with probability
1/2. Weaker correlations will be observed if spin is measured along two
different directions on the two subsystems. Entanglement thus introduces
what appear to be irreducible correlations between results of measurements
(even carried out at a distance), and this for a generic pair of tests.
The last two elements of quantum mechanics that we shall also refer to
are the Schro¨dinger equation and the notion of (self-ajoint) operator as an
observable quantity.
The Schro¨dinger equation describes the time evolution of quantum state
vectors. It is a linear and unitary equation, i. e. it maps linear combinations
into linear combinations, and it preserves the norm (length) of vectors. In
its most familiar form, it is a differential equation for the quantum states
represented as complex (square-integrable) functions on configuration space
(the space of positions of all particles), the so-called Schro¨dinger waves or
wave functions.
Operators, specifically self-adjoint operators (which by the spectral the-
orem can be decomposed uniquely — in the simplest case — into a sum of
projectors onto a family of mutually orthogonal subspaces) play two roles
in quantum mechanics. On the one hand they mathematically generate
Schro¨dinger-type evolutions, on the other hand they can be conveniently
used to classify simultaneous experimental tests of families of mutually or-
thogonal subspaces. A system will test positively to only one of these tests,
and to this test will be associated the measured value of the correspond-
ing observable. Instead of being understood as specifying probabilities for
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results of tests, quantum states can be thus equivalently understood as spec-
ifying expectation values for observables.
3 Quantum logic in a nutshell
3.1 Quantum logic as a logic of experimental propositions
The easiest way to introduce the concepts of quantum logic is in terms of a
logic of ‘experimental propositions’. That is, one can define explicitly some
non-classical connectives for a certain special class of propositions, relating
to idealised quantum mechanical tests. These connectives will be arguably
well suited for the limited subject matter at hand. If as a result one obtains
a logical system satisfying certain formal requirements, we shall say that one
has introduced a local non-classical logic. This is meant to be uncontrover-
sial. Indeed, it should be relatively uncontroversial that (provided the formal
requirements are indeed met) such a procedure is legitimate, although there
may still be scope for disagreement as to how useful the introduction of such
a logic is. In order to go on to assess Putnam’s further claims it is essential,
at least for the sake of argument, that one accept that in this sense different
logics may be more adapted to different subject matters.4
The prime example for such a procedure is Kolmogoroff’s (1931) inter-
pretation of intuitionistic logic as a calculus of mathematical tasks (Auf-
gabenrechnung). In this framework, each mathematical proposition p stands
for solving the corresponding mathematical task. The classical negation of
p (not solving the task) is not itself a mathematical task, so the chosen set
of propositions is not closed under classical negation. Instead, showing that
a task is impossible to solve is again a mathematical task. This justifies
introducing a strong negation, for which the law of excluded middle p ∨ ¬p
breaks down. On this basis, one can set up a logical system, which is just
the system of intuitionistic logic. More radical claims are not engaged with
at this stage. (Indeed, one can argue that this is the correct and only way
of interpreting intuitionistic logic, thus safeguarding the primacy of classical
4What we sketch here is quantum logic as descriptive of the empirical behaviour of
certain experiments (albeit idealised ones). One can of course also introduce quantum
logic abstractly and axiomatically based on the notion of a ‘yes-no’ test. This is the
approach of the so-called ‘Geneva school’ of quantum logic (see e. g. Jauch and Piron
1969).
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logic.)5
In the quantum context, let us define experimental propositions as (suit-
able equivalence classes of) statements of the form: ‘The system passes a
certain test with probability 1’. From the discussion in the previous sec-
tion, we recognise that these propositions are in bijective correspondence to
closed subspaces of the Hilbert space of the system. The classical negation
of such a proposition is not an experimental proposition in this sense. In-
stead, the proposition stating that the system passes with probability 1 the
test corresponding to the orthogonal complement of the given subspace is
an experimental proposition. This, again, can be taken to define a strong
negation. In the quantum case, however, we go further than in the case of
Kolmogoroff’s task logic. Indeed, even the classical disjunction of two ex-
perimental propositions p and q, corresponding to the set-theoretic union of
the two subspaces, is not itself a subspace in general, thus it is not an exper-
imental proposition. Instead, the proposition corresponding to the (closed)
span of the two subspaces P and Q (the smallest closed subspace containing
both the subspaces P and Q) is an experimental proposition, and we can
introduce a corresponding ‘quantum logical’ disjunction. This proposition
corresponds to the most stringent test that will be passed with probability
1 if the tests corresponding to P and Q will. The classical conjunction of
p and q, corresponding to the intersection of the two subspaces P and Q,
is itself an experimental proposition, so in this sense there is no need to
introduce a separate quantum logical conjunction. The closed subspaces of
a Hilbert space are ordered by inclusion and form a lattice (i. e. suprema
and infima are pairwise always well defined), which is further orthocom-
plemented under the orthogonal complement defined via the scalar product.
The quantum logical connectives correspond to the supremum, infimum and
orthocomplement in this lattice.
As a consequence of the introduction of the quantum logical connectives,
it is not the law of excluded middle that fails, but (one half of) the distribu-
tive law : the proposition p∧ (q∨ r) is generally weaker than the proposition
(p∧ q)∨ (p∧ r). This can be trivially seen by taking the subspaces Q and R
to be two rays spanning a plane, and P to be a ray lying in the same plane
but non-collinear with either Q or R. In that case, p∧ (q∨r) corresponds to
the same subspace as p, but both p∧ q and p∧ r correspond to the zero sub-
5There are further analogies between intuitionistic logic and quantum logic that could
be brought to bear on the issue of the revision of logic. Both logics, for instance, allow for
classical modal translations (see, respectively, Go¨del 1933, and Dalla Chiara 1981).
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space, and so does their quantum logical disjunction. Propositions that thus
engender violations of distributivity are called incompatible; more precisely,
two propositions p and q are called compatible iff the sublattice generated
by (the subspaces corresponding to) p, ¬p, q and ¬q is distributive.6
3.2 Formal properties of the logic
So far, what we have described is a semi-interpreted language (Van Fraassen,
1970). We have taken a propositional language, and we have fixed a class
of structures that are intended as models of the language, namely the class
of lattices of subspaces of Hilbert spaces (henceforth: Hilbert lattices). A
model in this sense will be a mapping of the propositions onto the subspaces
of some Hilbert space, such that (syntactic) conjunctions shall be mapped
to intersections, disjunctions to (closed) spans and negations to orthogonal
complements of the corresponding subspaces.
In order to say that we are introducing a logic in the formal sense (even
a local one), we must have at least also a notion of logical consequence and
of logical validity, and presumably other formal properties as well, such as
soundness and completeness results for some appropriate logical calculus.
With this in mind, let us return to the classical case. Also in the clas-
sical case, we could define a semi-interpreted language by defining a model
of the language in terms of subsets of some set, and mapping the logical
connectives to the corresponding set unions, set intersections, and comple-
ments within the set (these are the lattice operations for the subset ordering
relation). Every such lattice of subsets is a distributive lattice (also called a
Boolean lattice or Boolean algebra), and conversely every distributive lattice
is representable as the lattice of subsets of some set.
One can turn this semi-interpreted language into a logic by defining
truth valuations as (orthocomplemented-lattice) homomorphisms from an
arbitrary Boolean algebra onto the two-element algebra {0, 1}, and defining
the notion of logical validity by taking the class of all Boolean algebras as
reference class. That is, a sentence in the language will be a logical truth, iff
it is true under every truth valuation of every model. The logic characterised
6There is more than one definition of compatibility in the literature, but this is imma-
terial for the purposes of this paper. Furthermore, they all coincide in the important case
of orthomodular lattices.
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by this notion of logical validity can be axiomatised, is sound and complete,
and is of course the usual classical logic.
In order to extend this treatment to quantum logic, we need to extend
the notion of a truth valuation to non-distributive lattices. Homomorphisms
of the entire lattice onto {0, 1} will not do, because in general there are no
such total homomorphisms (Jauch and Piron 1963). More precisely, Jauch
and Piron show that any so-called orthomodular lattice (in particular any
Hilbert lattice) admits total homomorphisms onto {0, 1} iff it is distributive.7
Note that this means that any form of quantum logic must give up bivalence.
Thus, to insist that every proposition is indeed always true or false (as a
matter of logic!) would be question-begging, and, at least for the sake of
argument, the failure of bivalence must not be taken as a reason for rejecting
the whole framework out of hand.
Instead, one can define workable truth valuations as partial homomor-
phisms onto {0, 1}, i. e. homomorphisms q defined on some proper (ortho-
complemented) sublattice Q of a given lattice L, provided one requires also
that such a partial homomorphism be filtered, i. e. for all a ∈ Q and b ∈ L,
a < b, q(a) = 1 ⇒ b ∈ Q and q(b) = 1 , (6)
and maximal, i. e. have no proper extensions. The intuition behind these
properties is that as many propositions as possible should be true or false
under a truth valuation (maximality) and, in particular, a proposition that
is weaker than a true proposition should also be true (filtering). Both prop-
erties are of course trivial for total homomorphisms on Boolean lattices.
Note also that any partial homomorphism has both a canonical filtered ex-
tension and — by an application of Zorn’s lemma — a maximal extension.
A maximal partial homomorphism is always filtered.
A useful characterisation of truth valuations is the following. For any
partial homomorphism q, let S denote the subset of all s ∈ Q such that
q(s) = 1 (the set of all true propositions). The set S is a non-empty proper
subset of Q, closed under conjunctions. Together with property (6), this
means that it is a so-called filter ; and maximality of q means that S is a
maximal filter, so-called ultrafilter. Truth valuations q are thus in bijective
correspondence with ultrafilters S on the lattice. Note that S⊥ is the set of
all false propositions, and Q = S ∪ S⊥.
7A quick proof for the special case of Hilbert lattices is given in Bell (1987, pp. 5–6).
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Given the above definition of truth valuation, one can now proceed
with quantum logic as with classical logic and define a notion of logical
validity and logical consequence by fixing a suitable reference class of non-
distributive lattices. Quantum mechanics (if assumed to be strictly true)
tells us that the world is one specific (only partially known) Hilbert lattice,
but the corresponding notion of logic will need to be general enough to cover
all possible Hilbert lattices.8 Admittedly, the choice of reference class is not
as obvious as in the case of Boolean algebras, and there is some trade-off
involved in the choice. One could choose the class of all Hilbert lattices,
but it is unclear to date whether the resulting logic is axiomatisable. On
the other hand, one can choose more general classes of lattices as reference
class, for instance the class of all orthocomplemented lattices or the more
restrictive class of all orthomodular lattices. These yield axiomatisable log-
ics that are both sound and complete (see e. g. Dalla Chiara and Giuntini
2002, section 6). Note that the logic of all Hilbert lattices, the logic of all
orthomodular lattices and the logic of all orthocomplemented lattices are
indeed all distinct, i. e. they have different sets of logical truths.
Choosing the logic of all Hilbert lattices would more properly charac-
terise the ‘logic of quantum mechanics’. On the other hand, even if one
takes a reference class more general than that of all Hilbert lattices, one can
still argue that quantum phenomena have prompted the adoption (at least
locally) of a non-classical logic. (Also, as mentioned in section 6, quantum
theories of systems with infinitely many degrees of freedom seem to require
a larger reference class.) The choice of orthomodular lattices seems partic-
ularly attractive, since in an orthomodular lattice there is a unique condi-
tional reducing to the standard conditional for compatible propositions; the
resulting connective has some unusual features, but these can be explained
in analogy to counterfactual connectives, as is reasonably intuitive in a logic
that gives up bivalence (Hardegree 1975).
In any case, the resulting logic is strictly weaker than classical logic, since
the reference class that defines logical validity is extended beyond the class
of Boolean algebras. Irrespectively of the details of the choice, we shall take
it that such a notion of quantum logic provides us with a basis for discussing
Putnam’s claims, the interest of which after all lies primarily in the idea that
empirical considerations might force us to give up classical logic, and not
8Similarly, general relativity (if assumed to be strictly true) tells us that the world is
one specific (only partially known) Lorentzian manifold, but the corresponding notion of
geometry will cover all possible Lorentzian or pseudo-Riemannian manifolds.
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(or only in the second place) in the details of which logic should replace it.
3.3 Alternative frameworks
As an aside, let us remark that we have presented above merely one possi-
ble framework for introducing a quantum logic, and that others have been
proposed. We should mention two in particular.
First, one could choose a different idealisation for quantum mechanical
experiments, in order to include more realistic measurements (described
technically by positive-operator-valued measures rather than projection-
valued measures). This leads one to consider, instead of the lattice of pro-
jections (equivalent to the lattice of subspaces), the poset (partially ordered
set) of positive operators. This in turn prompts the introduction of fuzzy
quantum logics and other quantum logics that generalise the lattice-theoretic
approach (see e. g. Dalla Chiara and Giuntini 2002, sections 11–16). More
general poset-theoretical structures arise also as the logics associated with
theories of quantum probability, as in the test space approach of Foulis and
Randall (1981).
Second, one can focus on a different general aspect of quantum me-
chanical experiments, namely their incompatibility; and instead of intro-
ducing apparently new logical connectives, one can restrict the use of the
usual connectives to pairs of compatible propositions. This is the partial
Boolean algebra approach to quantum logic (Kochen and Specker 1965a, b,
1967), which also gives rise to logical systems with nice formal properties.
The partial Boolean algebra approach and the poset-theoretical approach
overlap, unsurprisingly, in that so-called transitive partial Boolean algebras
are canonically equivalent to so-called coherent orthomodular posets (Finch
1969, Gudder 1972), so that the corresponding logics are the same.
Note that the partial Boolean algebra approach may present advantages
to the advocate of a global revision of logic, because the implied revision
of logic appears to be more modest (although in a sense equivalent), and
because it is easier to argue that the meaning of the logical connectives
has remained the same. One does not construct new connectives that must
somehow turn out to be the usual ones in disguise. One merely needs to
argue that our usual connectives can be applied only to propositions that
are compatible, and that it is an empirical matter, settled in the negative
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by quantum mechanics, whether all propositions are indeed so. We shall
not attempt to develop here this line of argument, merely note that Putnam
himself switched to using at least the formalism of partial Boolean algebras
in some later publications (notably Friedman and Putnam 1978). We shall
keep to talking of quantum logic in the lattice-theoretic approach, because
most of the discussion about Putnam’s suggested revision of logic has been in
the context of this approach and of the corresponding failure of distributivity.
4 Standard interpretation and measurement prob-
lem of quantum mechanics
It is certainly an empirical fact that, if one defines experimental proposi-
tions as in the previous section, the resulting lattice fails to be distributive,
and a fact that is characteristic of quantum mechanics. If all physics were
classical, then the lattice of experimental propositions defined in this way
would be distributive. It may also be reasonable to want to define a local
non-distributive logic for dealing with such experimental propositions. How-
ever, it is not clear at this stage why this logic should be even a candidate
for a revised global logic. If one takes a ‘naive’ instrumentalist position,
then quantum mechanics just provides us with the means of calculating the
probabilities for the results of our experiments. The resulting procedure is
certainly different from that in any classical framework, but there seems to
be little need to revise anything but our algorithmic procedures for predict-
ing experimental results. If one adopts a subtler Bohrian position, then the
language of classical physics becomes a prerequisite for the description of
quantum experiments, so that the very formulation of quantum mechanics
would seem to require classical logic. Clearly, more than empirical consid-
erations are needed in order to mount a case for the revision of logic at
the global level. In particular, a strong opposition to the instrumentalist or
Bohrian position is necessary in order to reject the overall package that in-
cludes classical logic and an instrumentalist or Bohrian reading of quantum
mechanics.
In this section we shall sketch the ‘naive’ realist interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics. This interpretation, variously referred to as ‘standard’ or
‘orthodox’ or ‘von Neumann-Dirac’, is problematic, because it gives rise to
the usual paradoxes, but it is usually taken as the starting point for further
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discussion and elaboration of other subtler approaches to quantum mechan-
ics. It is thus, so to speak, the default realist position in the foundations of
quantum mechanics. And in fact, it is the interpretation of choice (at least
implicitly) also for discussions of Putnam’s claims on the revision of logic.
(Other realist approaches, and their implications for Putnam’s claims, will
be discussed in section 7.)
The standard interpretation consists in the following assignment of (in-
trinsic) properties to quantum systems. A quantum system has a certain
property iff it passes with probability 1 a corresponding experimental test
(in the sense of the previous section). Properties assigned in this way are
thus in bijective correspondence to the closed subspaces of Hilbert space.
What can it mean to assign such properties to a physical system?
The case of one-dimensional subspaces is relatively straightforward: a
one-dimensional subspace (ray) is the set of all scalar multiples of a given
vector, and these all describe the same quantum state. So, saying that
a quantum system has a certain one-dimensional property corresponds to
saying that its state is a certain vector in the Hilbert space.
The case of multi-dimensional properties is more difficult, but it is also
quite crucial. In this case, one should think of entangled systems, where
there is a vector describing the composite system but no vector describ-
ing each subsystem separately. The composite system will thus be assigned
a one-dimensional property, but not the subsystems. Nevertheless, if two
systems are entangled there are always multi-dimensional tests (in general
non-trivial) on the individual subsystems, for which the subsystems will test
positively with probability 1. Therefore, according to the standard interpre-
tation, the subsystems are assigned the corresponding multi-dimensional
properties. Unless one accepts some form of holism, in which only the com-
posite system is assigned intrinsic properties, one is forced to generalise the
notion of properties for the individual subsystems to include also multi-
dimensional ones.
The motivation behind the standard interpretation can be phrased in the
language of dispositions. Quantum mechanical systems exhibit a range of
dispositional properties in the context of experimental tests, some of which
are sure-fire dispositions. The standard interpretation suggests that these
sure-fire dispositions (whether one-dimensional or multi-dimensional) sup-
port an inference to real, objective properties of the quantum system, which
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are revealed by idealised tests.
But now, enter the paradoxes, specifically the measurement problem
and Schro¨dinger’s cat (which we shall take here as two examples of the
same problem). If we take quantum mechanics to be correct and univer-
sally valid, then one can easily construct examples in which the dynamics
of the theory, the Schro¨dinger equation, will lead to entanglement between
microscopic and macroscopic systems, e. g. between a quantum system being
measured and the corresponding measuring apparatus, or between a micro-
scopic system and a cat, in such a way that macroscopically distinguishable
states of the apparatus (different readings) or the cat (alive or dead) are
correlated with different states of the microscopic system. In such cases, on
the standard interpretation, only the multi-dimensional subspaces spanned
by the macroscopically distinguishable states correspond to properties of the
macroscopic system, and these do not correspond to the macroscopic states
we witness (the different readings, the cat alive or dead).9
One could say, paradoxically, that the cat is neither alive nor dead, but
this formulation trades on an ambiguity: this statement would be paradox-
ical if ‘dead’ were understood as ‘not alive’ in the classical sense, but if it is
understood as ‘not alive’ in the sense of the strong negation of quantum logic
(assuming that the live and dead states span the Hilbert space of the cat),
then the statement makes perfect sense since in this case ‘dead’ is strictly
stronger than the classical ‘not alive’.
9Furthermore, this problem cannot be lifted by modelling the states of the apparatus as
statistical distributions over microscopic states. If the dynamics is the unitary Schro¨dinger
dynamics, one cannot reproduce the correct measurement statistics for all initial states,
unless the state of the apparatus depends on the state of the system to be measured.
This result was known already to von Neumann — indeed it prefaces his discussion of
measurement in quantum mechanics (von Neumann 1932, section VI.3). For a modern,
more general discussion, see e. g. Brown (1986) and references therein.
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5 Quantum logic and the standard interpretation
of quantum mechanics
5.1 Quantum logic as a logic of properties
The obvious interest of the standard interpretation, from the point of view of
quantum logic, is that it allows one to apply the quantum logical structures
introduced for experimental propositions also to propositions about intrinsic
properties of a quantum system. Thus one speaks of the property lattice of
the system, or of the lattice of ‘testable’ propositions about the system.
This move from experimental propositions to properties of a system is
explicitly made for instance by Jauch and Piron (1969), who further propose
that a quantum state should be understood as the set (in fact the ultrafilter)
of true properties about the system. They thus propose, in effect, that a
quantum state should be understood as a truth valuation on the lattice
of properties of a quantum system. And, indeed, quantum states in the
sense of rays in the Hilbert space are in bijective correspondence to the
ultrafilters of true propositions they generate (by assigning them probability
1 upon measurement). Thus, truth valuations on the Hilbert lattice of
quantum propositions encode all the information about quantum mechanical
expectation values.
Abstractly, the introduction of quantum logic for testable propositions
is possible simply because there is a bijective correspondence between the
experimental propositions and the testable propositions (both being in bi-
jective correspondence with the closed subspaces of the Hilbert space). A
closed subspace of the Hilbert space will now represent a proposition about
an intrinsic property of the relevant quantum system, and the closed span,
intersection and orthogonal complement of such subspaces will correspond to
the quantum logical disjunction, conjunction and negation of the respective
propositions.
Concretely, the standard interpretation introduces properties correspond-
ing to one-dimensional subspaces P , Q etc., and properties corresponding
to multi-dimensional subspaces such as the span of P and Q. The novelty
of these properties lies in the fact that under all possible truth valuations,
whenever P obtains or whenever Q obtains, also the property correspond-
ing to their span obtains. The interpretation of this property as a quantum
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logical disjunction p∨q allows one to interpret such relations between propo-
sitions as relations of logical consequence.
By considering quantum logic at the level of intrinsic properties of phys-
ical objects, we make a further step in the direction of Putnam’s proposals.
Indeed, at least as regards the more modest claim (a), the fact that this
logic in general is a non-distributive lattice is clearly an empirical fact. The
fact that it is best understood as a semi-interpreted language, and the fact
that this language has a number of properties that justify calling it a logic
in the formal sense, have been discussed above. In this sense thus, it should
be relatively uncontroversial that quantum phenomena give us empirical
grounds for introducing a logic adapted to the world of physics that is non-
distributive and hence non-classical. I take it that what we have called above
Putnam’s claim (a) is thus both intelligible and justifiable.
The claim that is controversial is claim (b), that this gives us further
reasons to revise logic tout court, i. e. that this logic of testable quantum
mechanical propositions, or logic of quantum mechanics, is in fact the ‘true’
logic and that we have failed to recognise so far that our usual, apparently
classical connectives are in fact the connectives of quantum logic. We turn
at last to this controversial point, for the time being in the context of the
standard interpretation of quantum mechanics.
5.2 The revision of logic
If we have successfully introduced the quantum logical connectives in the
context of propositions about material properties of physical objects, is this
not ipso facto saying that ‘the logic’ of the world is quantum? Surely quan-
tum mechanics is a theory that applies to all material objects, so that the
resulting quantum logic is not a local but a global logic?
As mentioned in the introduction, the fact that one may justify the
introduction of non-classical connectives does not yet mean that logic has
been revised. The crucial point is whether these connectives have been
introduced alongside the classical connectives, or whether they replace them
(in an appropriate sense). As we shall see now, the standard interpretation
is neutral with regard to this question. Indeed, one has a choice between
two opposing views.
18
On the one hand, it is perfectly possible to interpret the properties as-
signed to systems in the standard interpretation as elementary properties
in the sense of classical logic. Indeed, a quantum logical disjunction p ∨ q
classically must be an elementary proposition: it is not a classical disjunc-
tion of terms that include p and q, although one might be tempted to think
that it is the disjunction of all one-dimensional subspaces contained in the
span of P and Q. As a matter of fact, this is not true: if it were, in the
case of entangled systems there would be a quantum state that describes an
individual subsystem, contrary to what quantum mechanics says. On top of
the elementary propositions, however, one can perfectly well consider com-
plex ones, constructing them by applying the classical connectives to this
new quantum set of elementary propositions, e. g. the disjunction of all one-
dimensional subspaces contained in the span of P and Q can be considered
alongside with the quantum disjunction p ∨ q itself. The quantum aspect
is physical and lies in the determination of the elementary properties, while
the logic remains classical.
This position has admittedly some disadvantages. Complex propositions
in general are not directly testable, i. e. verifiable with probability 1. This
is simply because neither the set union of P and Q nor the set complement
of P are subspaces of the Hilbert space. This would thus be an empirical
limitation characteristic of quantum mechanics. More importantly, perhaps,
the above relation between p or q and the quantum logical p ∨ q cannot be
analysed as logical consequence. That is, there are triples of propositions
p, q, r such that whenever p or q hold, also r holds; but since r is elementary,
this relation of consequence cannot be anlysed as logical consequence.
This, however, may seem a small price to pay in order to refrain from
revising our logic. And in fact, we shall see in section 7 that this is arguably
the position most naturally associated with the approaches to quantum me-
chanics known as spontaneous collapse theories.
The opposite position consists in maintaining that the properties as-
signed in the standard interpretation are all the possible properties of a
physical system: there is no property corresponding to the classical disjunc-
tion of p and q, or to the classical negation of p. An equivalent way of saying
this is that if p and q are the propositions that some physical quantities take
certain values, say ‘A = 4’ and ‘B = 9’, then there is no meaningful physical
quantity that can encode the classical disjunction ‘A = 4 or B = 9’. Note
that there is no quantum mechanical observable that encodes it. Indeed, in
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disanalogy to classical physics, the operator (A− 4)(B − 9) in general does
not represent a quantum mechanical quantity, because in general the oper-
ators A and B do not commute (so that (A− 4)(B − 9) is not self-adjoint).
But if there is no meaningful physical quantity whatsoever that represents
a classical disjunction, insisting that the properties of the standard inter-
pretation are elementary would mean that the vast majority of complex
propositions constructed from elementary propositions about quantum sys-
tems are meaningless.
If one drops altogether the possibility of using the classical connectives
to form complex propositions, one can instead interpret some of the testable
propositions as complex propositions in the sense of quantum logic. In so
doing one removes the mismatch between logical propositions and phys-
ical propositions (indeed, all propositions are testable propositions), and
one ensures that the consequence relation described above between testable
propositions and their quantum disjunctions is indeed a relation of logical
consequence.
This is presumably the best case that can be made for a revision of logic
in the context of the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is
not made explicitly by Putnam, although some of it must be implicit in his
discussion; it is present more or less in Dickson (2001), who explicitly de-
nies the ‘empirical significance’ of classical disjunctions and negations. Still,
it appears that if one follows this line of argument, the quantum logical
connectives have supplanted the meaningless classical ones. What about the
claim that the quantum logical connectives are the same as the classical con-
nectives? Indeed, since every physical system is a quantum system, we seem
to have arrived at the conclusion that an ‘everyday’ disjunctive proposition
about any physical object whatsoever is meaningless. But Putnam’s claim
that the classical and quantum connectives are the same is surely meant in
the sense that we should be able to gain a better understanding of our usual
everyday classical connectives by realising that they are indeed quantum
logical.
What is missing from the above is an explanation of why classical logic
appears to have been so effective until now. One needs to explain how, if the
true logic is non-distributive, it is still possible for the connectives to behave
truth-functionally in special cases. This would give rise to the possibility
of abstracting classical logic (empirically!) from our everyday use, and of
applying it in the appropriate circumstances (as Putnam undoubtedly did
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in the act of writing his famous paper).
Putnam’s claim (c), that adopting quantum logic will solve the para-
doxes of quantum mechanics, can be understood as an attempt to fill this
gap: the quantum logical point of view does indeed explain, according to
Putnam, why the world appears classical to us. Indeed, for Putnam the main
advantage of a revision of logic is precisely that it will solve the paradoxes
of quantum mechanics. We shall briefly discuss now how Putnam argues
for this point and why his arguments are justly regarded as flawed. One
other author at least, namely Dickson, attempts to argue that, although
the quantum connectives are the true connectives, they behave classically
when applied to the everyday, macroscopic realm. As we shall also see, his
attempt appears to fail on ultimately similar grounds.
If this is so, then we are left with the following situation. There is a
coherent, perhaps even a reasonably convincing case to be made that a non-
classical logic is well adapted to a world in which quantum mechanics under
the standard interpretation is true. But this world is hugely different from
our own. This is precisely what the measurement problem and Schro¨dinger’s
cat highlight. Indeed, in such a world it would not seem possible for any
intelligent beings to develop at all, let alone beings capable of formulating
any kind of logic (let alone quantum mechanics). If the argument does not
apply to our world (or at least to a possible world similar to ours), then it
loses most of its interest.
5.3 Putnam and the paradoxes
The seemingly logical paradox of Schro¨dinger’s cat, that the cat is neither
alive nor dead, trades as we have mentioned on the ambiguity between clas-
sical and quantum logical terms. Putnam’s way of resolving the paradox is
to choose a strictly quantum logical reading: ‘dead’ is interpreted as ‘not
alive’ in the quantum logical sense of orthocomplementation in the lattice,
and the cat is then indeed alive or dead, but in the sense of the quantum
logical disjunction. Putnam, however, seems to want to go further, namely
he claims that, since the cat is alive or dead (quantum logically), there is a
matter of fact about the biological state of the cat.
To make the point clearer, let us take an example adapted from Putnam
himself (1968, pp. 184–185). Consider an n-dimensional Hilbert space and
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take an orthonormal basis |x1〉, . . . , |xn〉 in the Hilbert space, which one can
associate with a family of tests, or equivalently with some observable X.
Denoting the propositions corresponding to the one-dimensional projectors
onto the basis vectors as x1, . . . , xn, the following is a true proposition under
all truth valuations:
x1 ∨ . . . ∨ xn . (7)
Its truth, however, is understood by Putnam as meaning that the observable
X has indeed a value corresponding to one of the xi. As the reasoning
is independent of the particular choice of basis, Putnam concludes that
the system possesses values for all such observables. He then interprets
measurements as simply revealing those preexisting values, thus proposing
that the measurement problem of quantum mechanics is solved by a move
to quantum logic.
This is rather bewildering, since, as we have seen in section 3, quantum
logic comes equipped with a well-defined semantics, which underlies the
quantum logical notion of consequence. And we have seen that truth valua-
tions in this semantics are such that the proposition x1∨ . . .∨xn can be true
without any of the xi being true. Any quantum state that is a non-trivial
linear combination of the basis vectors will define such a truth valuation;
and in the case of entangled systems, we have seen that a quantum logi-
cal proposition can be true without any of the one-dimensional projections
spanning it being true. To be fair, at the time of Putnam’s 1968 paper, the
semantics of quantum logic was not fully developed as yet, but the reasoning
implied in the paper seems to be technically in error, since he appears to be
using a different semantics from that required in quantum logic.
A more charitable reading (perhaps more in line with his later papers,
e. g. Putnam 1981), takes Putnam as distinguishing between a quantum
level, obeying quantum logic, and a ‘hidden’ level obeying classical logic. It
has in particular been suggested that Putnam’s proposals can be analysed
in terms of a so-called non-contextual hidden variables theory (Friedman
and Glymour 1972), which however confronts them with the standard prob-
lems facing such approaches, notably the no-go theorem by Kochen and
Specker (1967). Perhaps more plausibly, it has also been suggested to anal-
yse Putnam’s proposals in terms of a so-called contextual hidden variables
theory (Bacciagaluppi 1993), which however confronts them with the proofs
of non-locality for this kind of approaches, specifically those by Heywood
and Redhead (1983) and by Stairs (1983). In either case, however, Putnam
would seem to be backing away from the proposal that quantum logic is the
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global logic. (For Putnam’s most recent views on the subject, see Putnam
1994.) In section 7, we shall return to the issue of quantum logic in hidden
variables approaches, namely in the context of the most successful of these,
pilot-wave or de Broglie-Bohm theory.
Dickson’s (2001) attempt to explain how classical logic is effective despite
quantum logic supposedly being the global logic, proceeds along slightly dif-
ferent lines. Dickson points out that in the macroscopic realm, when talking
about measurement results or cats, we apply logic always to a distribu-
tive sublattice of all (quantum logical) propositions. As it stands, however,
this argument is inconclusive. The sublattice generated by the propositions
x1, . . . , xn in Putnam’s example is distributive, but this fact does not guar-
antee that the logical connectives will behave truth-functionally, and that is
what is at stake. Again to be fair, Dickson suggests that the proper frame-
work for discussing Putnam’s claims is that of the more general quantum-like
theories based on the formalism of von Neumann algebras. And we shall see
in the next section that in that framework the connectives can indeed be
shown to behave truth-functionally in certain cases.
As far as the claim concerns the usual formalism of quantum mechanics,
however, it may be that Dickson falls prey to a common fallacy. Admittedly,
it is a fact that we cannot construct in practice an experiment that would
test for a macroscopically entangled state (in particular because of the phe-
nomenon called decoherence), and that at the macroscopic level the only
tests we have available are all compatible (so that the corresponding experi-
mental propositions form a distributive lattice). And this fact has often been
trumpeted as showing that the measurement problem does not arise. But
this practical impossibility is irrelevant to the point that macroscopically
entangled states (under the standard interpretation) are incompatible with
macroscopic objects having the properties they appear to have, nor does it
show that such states do not arise in practice. It thus seems that Dickson’s
argument fails to improve on Putnam’s attempt.
6 Quantum logic and classical propositions
Before proceeding further and enquiring into the status of quantum logic in
realist approaches to quantum mechanics other than the standard interpre-
tation, let us dwell in more detail on the question of what it could mean for
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the quantum logical connectives to be the same as the classical connectives.
There is an interesting way of making the case that the meaning of the
connectives is indeed the same in classical and quantum logic, namely to
argue that it is always given in terms of the supremum, infimum and ortho-
complement of the lattice: the conjunction of two propositions is the weakest
proposition that implies both propositions, their disjunction is the strongest
proposition that is implied by either, and the negation of a proposition is
its orthocomplement in the lattice. Until empirical evidence for quantum
mechanics was obtained, we used to believe that all lattices of propositions
we could ever consider would be distributive. We used to believe that the
universe of sets was the correct framework for abstract semantics, because
we believed it was rich enough to describe the physical world. But, so the
argument goes, it has turned out that it is only the ‘universe of Hilbert
spaces’ that is rich enough for that purpose. (This line of thought presup-
poses of course that one has already accepted that the logic should be read
off the structure of the lattice of empirical propositions.)
The trouble with this suggestion is that, although at this more general
level the quantum and classical connectives can thus be said to be the same,
still, if the actual lattice of properties is a Hilbert lattice (of dimension
greater than 1), the connectives will just not behave truth-functionally, so
that the quantum connectives do not seem to reduce to the classical ones in
everyday macroscopic situations. This is precisely the problem facing Dick-
son: can one have the (unique) logical connectives behave truth-functionally
when applied to some propositions in the lattice but not to others? We shall
see in the present section that, if, as is quite standardly done, one defines
logical consequence through a reference class of lattices that is larger than
the class of all Hilbert lattices (which, as noted above, is not known to lead
to an axiomatisable logic), in particular if one considers quantum logic to be
the logic of all orthocomplemented lattices or of all orthomodular lattices,
then there is a rigorous sense in which the connectives interpreted in these
non-distributive lattices (i. e. the standard quantum logical connectives) can
behave truth-functionally in certain cases. Thus, at least in this more ab-
stract setting, there are situations in which one could arguably ‘mistake’ the
logic to be classical.
Recall that two propositions p and q are compatible iff the lattice gen-
erated by p, ¬p, q and ¬q is distributive. For a subset A of an orthocom-
plemented lattice L, denote by Ac the set of propositions compatible with
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all propositions in A. If one considers lattices L more general than Hilbert
lattices, the set Lc (the so-called centre of the lattice) may be non-trivial,
i. e. there may exist propositions (other than the trivially true proposition)
that are compatible with all propositions in the lattice. Such propositions
are called classical propositions. Now, it is a theorem that under any truth
valuation on L, a classical proposition is always true or false.
Indeed, let q be a truth valuation from L onto {0, 1}, defined on an
orthosublattice Q = S ∪ S⊥ of L, where S is the ultrafilter of propositions
made true by q. For any ultrafilter S in L,
(S ∪ S⊥)c ⊂ (S ∪ S⊥) (8)
(Raggio 1981, Appendix 5, Proposition 3). A classical proposition, being
compatible with any a ∈ L, is obviously contained in (S ∪ S⊥)c for any set
S. Therefore, for any truth valuation q, c ∈ Q, i. e. q(c) = 1 or q(c) = 0.
QED.
It now follows, just as in the classical case, that if a lattice contains clas-
sical propositions, the lattice-theoretical connectives applied to the classical
propositions will behave truth-functionally, in particular for any two classi-
cal propositions a and b, and any truth valuation q that makes a∨ b true, q
will make a true or b true.
Indeed, let q be any truth valuation with q(a ∨ b) = 1. Since a and b
are classical, by the above they are both either true or false under q. But if
q(a) = 0 and q(b) = 0, then, since q is homomorphic, q(a ∨ b) = 0, contrary
to assumption. Therefore, if a and b are classical,
q(a ∨ b) = 1 ⇒ q(a) = 1 or q(b) = 1 , (9)
for any truth valuation q. QED.
Note that the fact that a certain proposition a is classical depends on
the lattice L chosen as a model of the logic. Specifically, it depends on the
relation of a with all the other propositions in the chosen model. It thus
depends on the meaning of a. We see that the quantum logical connectives
can indeed behave truth-functionally in certain models, but depending on
the meaning of the propositions involved. Classical logic appears to be valid
in special cases, but the additional inferences one can make in these cases are
not logical inferences: they are not based on the propositional form of the
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statements involved, they are based instead on the fact that the statements
have a classical content.
If the lattice of properties in our world is the lattice of projections of
some Hilbert space, our world does not contain classical propositions (pace
Putnam and Dickson). On the other hand, at least some lattices that are
more general than Hilbert lattices appear to be physically motivated. In-
deed, generalisations of quantum mechanics that allow in general for classical
propositions exist, and are required to treat systems with infinitely many
degrees of freedom, such as in quantum field theory or in quantum statistical
mechanics (when taking thermodynamic limits).
Mathematically, these theories are based on more abstract algebras of
observables than the algebra of (self-adjoint) operators on a Hilbert space.
For the purposes of quantum logic, the most interesting class of such al-
gebras is that of so-called von Neumann (or W ∗-) algebras, which can be
represented as certain subalgebras of operators on Hilbert space. Von Neu-
mann algebras can be generated by their projections, so that one can again
reduce all statements about observables to statements about projections
(i. e. to yes-no tests).10 The lattices of projections of von Neumann algebras
are always orthomodular lattices. (Indeed, historically, the study of or-
thomodular lattices developed out of the study of von Neumann algebras.)
Therefore, unless one insists on characterising quantum logic by the class
of all Hilbert lattices, lattices of projections of von Neumann algebras are
already included in the models of the most usual varieties of quantum logic,
and they are thus a bona fide source of examples for the behaviour of the
usual quantum logical connectives. Incidentally, we note that J. von Neu-
mann is also associated both with the standard interpretation of quantum
mechanics (rightly or wrongly), through his book Mathematische Grundla-
gen der Quantenmechanik (von Neumann 1932), and with the first proposal
that quantum mechanics should be interpreted in terms of a non-distributive
logic, clearly stated in his paper with Birkhoff four years later (Birkhoff and
von Neumann 1936).
When we say that general lattices of projections of von Neumann alge-
bras include classical propositions, the intuition behind it is that there is a
10Indeed, Raggio (1981) has proved that if L is the projection lattice of aW ∗-algebraM,
there is a bijective correspondence between truth valuations on L and pure normal states
on M, in the sense of normalised positive linear functionals. That is, truth valuations
indeed encode all the information about expectation values of observables in the algebra.
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breakdown in the linear structure of the state space of a physical system.
Indeed, defining a classical observable as an observable C such that propo-
sitions of the form ‘C has value α’ are classical, superpositions of states in
which a classical observable has different values simply do not exist (one
says that such states are separated by a superselection rule).
The framework of von Neumann algebras is general enough to include
both quantum and classical physics, and intermediate theories besides. For
instance, one can build algebras that are tensor products of a standard
quantum system and a purely classical system, and for which there are no
states entangling the quantum system and the classical system (Raggio 1988,
see also Baez 1987). Although it is generally believed that such theories
would be rather ad hoc, they do allow one to describe a world in which
the measurement problem of quantum mechanics does not arise, a world in
which all measuring apparatuses (as well as cats) are made up of classical
observables.
It is instructive to see explicitly how the truth-functionality of the quan-
tum logical connectives would apply to a measurement scenario if the ‘pointer’
observable of a measuring apparatus were assumed to be a classical ob-
servable C. Suppose the apparatus measures a non-classical observable B
taking, say, the two values ±1. Now assume that at the end of an (ideal)
measurement the following proposition is true (in obvious notation):
(B = 1 ∧ C = 1) ∨ (B = −1 ∧ C = −1) , (10)
where ∧ and ∨ denote the infimum and supremum in the lattice. We can
now show from the fact that C is classical that the disjunction in (10) is
truth-functional, i. e. under any truth valuation q that makes (10) true,
(B = 1 ∧ C = 1) or (B = −1 ∧ C = −1) are also true.
Let q be such a truth valuation, i. e.
q
(
(B = 1 ∧ C = 1) ∨ (B = −1 ∧ C = −1)
)
= 1 . (11)
We need to show that
q(B = 1 ∧ C = 1) = 1 or q(B = −1 ∧ C = −1) = 1 . (12)
Because q is filtered, we have
q(C = 1 ∨ C = −1) = 1 . (13)
27
Since C is classical,
q(C = 1) = 1 or q(C = −1) = 1 , (14)
by (9). Suppose for instance that q(C = 1) = 1. Since q is a homomorphism,
we have that
q
[(
(B = 1 ∧ C = 1) ∨ (B = −1 ∧ C = −1)
)
∧ C = 1
]
= 1 . (15)
But now, the propositions B = ±1, C = ±1 are all mutually compatible, so
that we can distribute over ∨ in (15), yielding
q(B = 1 ∧ C = 1) = 1 . (16)
Analogously, if q(C = −1) = 1 we obtain q(B = −1 ∧ C = −1) = 1. QED.
Note in particular that the truth-functionality has spread to propositions
that include non-classical terms. (This appears to be related to the results
by Bub and Clifton (1996) on maximal truth-value assignments in a Hilbert
lattice compatible with a certain ‘preferred’ observable being assigned defi-
nite values.)
If such examples do not describe the actual physics, however, what have
we gained in showing that the connectives can sometimes behave truth-
functionally? We should perhaps distinguish two questions: (i) Can we
envisage worlds, perhaps merely inspired by quantum mechanics and suffi-
ciently close to our own, in which we would consider revising our logic? (ii)
Is our world such a world?
In a world as the above, one could indeed maintain that the only mean-
ingful propositions are the propositions in the lattice, since the lattice is
general enough to include propositions for which classical logic holds. Thus,
a generalised quantum mechanics together with the standard interpretation
could arguably meet the objections detailed in the previous section against
a revision of logic. We can thus make a case that logic is empirical because
there is a possible world in which we might be prompted by empirical consid-
erations to revise our logic (question (i)). This is different from establishing
that in our world we may have good reasons for a revision of logic (question
(ii)). Note that while Putnam’s ultimate aim was to show that logic is in-
deed empirical, his actual claim was that we have reasons to revise our logic
in this world.
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In order to proceed further with question (ii), and thus address the
revision of logic in Putnam’s own terms, we shall have to return to standard
quantum mechanics However, we shall have to consider approaches to the
foundations of quantum mechanics other than the standard interpretation,
in particular approaches that have some credible claim to providing solutions
to the puzzles of the standard theory.
7 Quantum logic in other approaches to quantum
mechanics
We now leave the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics. While
reverting to the standard formalism of quantum mechanics in this section,
we shall discuss the status of the claims about quantum logic in the context of
other approaches to the foundations of quantum mechanics, approaches that
do propose solutions to the puzzles presented to us by quantum mechanics
and in particular propose to explain why classical logic is effective (whether
or not it be the true logic) in a world in which quantum mechanics is indeed
true. The approaches we shall discuss in turn are (i) the pilot-wave theory of
de Broglie and Bohm, (ii) spontaneous collapse theories, and (iii) the Everett
or many-worlds interpretation. (The presentation of these approaches will
necessarily be rather condensed.)
7.1 De Broglie-Bohm theory
The pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm is a very well-known and
well-understood approach to the foundations of quantum mechanics. The
theory, as presented by Louis de Broglie at the fifth Solvay conference in
October 1927 (de Broglie 1928), is a new dynamics for n-particle systems,
described in configuration space (which encodes only the positions of the
particles) rather than in phase space. The motion of the particles is deter-
mined by a field of velocities defined by the phase S of the complex wave
function. At least as regards particle detections, the theory can clearly pre-
dict both interference and diffraction phenomena: around the zeros of the
wave function, the phase S will behave very irregularly, so one can at least
qualitatively expect that the particles will be driven away from regions of
configuration space where the wave function is small (as is indeed the case).
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In fact, it was the qualitative prediction of electron diffraction and its ex-
perimental detection that established the significance of de Broglie’s matter
waves even before his detailed theory of 1927.
The measurement theory for observables other than functions of position
was worked out in general by David Bohm, who rediscovered the theory a
quarter of a century later (Bohm 1952). Indeed, it is at first puzzling how
such a theory of particles in motion may effectively reproduce the collapse
process and the rest of the full phenomenology of quantum mechanics. In
modern terminology, what Bohm showed in general is that in situations
such as measurements, the wave function of the total system decoheres, that
is different components of the wave function effectively cease to interfere,
because they are in fact separated in configuration space by regions with
very small wave function. This has as a consequence that the configuration
of the system is effectively trapped inside one of the components. This
component alone will be relevant at later times for the dynamics of the
system, so that the particles behave as if the wave function had collapsed.
Quantitatively, the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics are re-
produced if the positions of the particles are distributed according to the
usual quantum distribution. As was known to de Broglie, the velocity field
preserves the form of the particle distribution if at any time it is given by
the quantum distribution. Intuitively, this is some kind of time-dependent
equilibrium distribution, and there is indeed a deep analogy between the
statistical aspects of de Broglie-Bohm theory and classical statistical me-
chanics. Under the assumption of non-equilibrium distributions, the theory
instead yields novel predictions as compared to quantum mechanics. Fur-
thermore, pilot-wave theory is explicitly non-local, as any hidden variables
theory must be in order to recover the quantum mechanical violations of the
Bell inequalities. Finally, the theory can be easily modified to include spin;
and various generalisations aiming to cover quantum electrodynamics and
other field theories have been proposed. Incidentally, J. S. Bell contributed
decisively to the theory’s current revival (Bell 1987, passim).
As regards quantum logic, it is obvious that since de Broglie-Bohm the-
ory reproduces the phenomenology of quantum mechanics, physical systems
have the same dispositions to elicit measurement results in pilot-wave theory
as in standard quantum mechanics. The introduction of the connectives at
the level of the experimental propositions therefore goes through unaltered.
At the level of the intrinsic properties of a system, however, it should be
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clear that configuration-space properties obey classical logic no less than
phase-space properties in classical physics. Indeed, de Broglie-Bohm theory
can be viewed as a theory that is entirely classical at the level of kinematics
(particles moving in space and time), and which is quantum only as regards
its ‘new dynamics’ (as the title of de Broglie’s paper reads). Thus, the way
de Broglie-Bohm theory explains the effectivenesss of classical logic at the
macroscopic level is that it is already the logic that is operative at the hidden
(‘untestable’) level of the particles.
Indeed, the emergence of the classical world around us in de Broglie-
Bohm theory happens as follows. At the level of the wave function, a pro-
cess of decoherence ensures that macroscopically different components will
develop that will not generally reinterfere, e. g. it ensures that the ‘live’ and
‘dead’ components of the state of the cat do not reinterfere. What turns
these different components into different classical alternatives, however, is
the fact that the configuration of the system is located only in one of these
different components, and this is already a matter of classical logic. The
cat is (classically) either alive or dead, because the particles that compose it
are (classically) either in the live component or the dead component of the
quantum state. (Decoherence further ensures that they will stay there over
time, but this is irrelevant to the point at hand.)
Thus, if one takes the pilot-wave approach to quantum mechanics, al-
though quantum logic may be introduced as a local logic at the level of
experimental propositions, it cannot be taken as the basis for justifying the
everyday use of classical logic, and thus cannot aspire to replace classical
logic as the ‘true’ logic.11
Incidentally, de Broglie-Bohm theory lends itself to discussing issues of
conventionalism by analogy to the case of geometry (i. e. the choice between
revising physics or geometry), as mentioned in section 1. In the case of
general relativity, one can take the metric of space-time to be Einstein’s gµν
and the geometry to be curved, or one can take the metric to be the flat
11If one wishes, one can choose a dual ontology for the theory, in which both the
configurations and the wave function are properties of the system. In this case, one can
argue that quantum logic is applicable also in pilot-wave theory to describe those intrinsic
properties of a system that are encoded in its quantum state (which above we have called
testable properties). However, one rejects the completeness of the standard interpretation,
and at the additional level of the hidden variables one retains classical logic. It is the
classical logic of the hidden variables that explains the effectiveness of classical logic at
the macroscopic level.
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Lorentzian ηµν and write
gµν = ηµν + hµν , (17)
where hµν is a new physical field, and the geometry is still the flat geometry
of special relativity. This treatment (which lies at the basis of some attempts
to quantise gravity) is observationally equivalent to standard general rela-
tivity only given some constraints on the topology of the phenomenological
space-time (i. e. as described by gµν), but given those constraints, the flat
geometry underlying the split (17) is unobservable, and thus the choice be-
tween the two descriptions is conventional.
Similarly in the case of quantum mechanics: if one accepts some form
of Putnam’s argument (say, in the context of an Everett interpretation —
see below), then keeping quantum mechanics as it is might indeed prompt
us to revise our logic. But one can always retain classical logic, and have
de Broglie-Bohm theory give a story of why this classical level is ‘hidden’.
The theory will be observationally equivalent to standard quantum mechan-
ics only given some constraints on the position distribution of the particles
(‘equilibrium’), but given these constraints the postulated classical level is
indeed not directly observable, and, always given the constraints, one could
again argue that the choice between the two descriptions is conventional.
7.2 Spontaneous collapse theories
Spontaneous collapse theories are variants of quantum mechanics in which
the Schro¨dinger evolution is modified in order to reproduce the phenomenol-
ogy of collapse. Such theories are generally stochastic, and the best-known
ones are on the one hand theories of the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW)
type, in which the Schro¨dinger equation is supplemented by certain dis-
continuous random transformations (Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber 1986); on
the other hand the theory of continuous spontaneous localisation (CSL) and
related ones, in which the wave function obeys a stochastic differential equa-
tion of a certain type (Pearle 1989). For simplicity, we shall focus on the
former.
The original version of the GRW theory consists of the following stochas-
tic evolution of the wave function. For one particle, the Schro¨dinger equation
is supplemented at random times (with a fixed average frequency 1/τ) by
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a transformation known as a ‘hit’, namely a multiplication with a three-
dimensional Gaussian αλ(q − x), with a fixed width λ, centred at some
random position x, for which the theory specifies a probability density. For
n particles there are n independent such three-dimensional hitting processes
supplementing the Schro¨dinger equation, which greatly increases the fre-
quency of any such hit.
The form of this evolution is the same as that used to describe some of
the more general collapses observed in less idealised experiments, in this case
an ‘unsharp’ measurement of position. The novelty with respect to the usual
notion of collapse, however, is that this evolution is spontaneous, i. e. takes
place irrespectively of the presence or absence of a measuring apparatus
or any other system. Indeed, the theory is specifically intended to provide
an approach to quantum mechanics that makes it universally applicable, in
particular both to the microscopic and the macroscopic domains, as well as
to their interaction.
The way the GRW theory proposes to solve the measurement problem
relies on the entangled form of the wave function in typical measurement
situations, with components of the wave function corresponding (in the stan-
dard interpretation) to macroscopically different states of the apparatus. For
such states, even a single hit will trigger collapse on a macroscopic scale.
Thus, at least prima facie, spontaneous collapse theories such as GRW em-
brace the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics but change the
dynamics given by the Schro¨dinger equation, so that the states that do not
correspond to our everyday experience are very efficiently suppressed.
This might seem to suggest that in spontaneous collapse approaches one
can indeed maintain that quantum logic is the true logic, since (as discussed
in section 5) the standard interpretation is compatible with this claim, and
since spontaneous collapse removes the objections to the standard inter-
pretation. However, spontaneous collapse theories solve the measurement
problem by introducing classical alternatives in the possible evolution of the
state, through the stochastic element of the dynamics. Thus, spontaneous
collapse theories should be understood according to the alternative position
that takes the properties assigned by the standard interpretation to be el-
ementary properties, and complex ones as built from these using classical
logic. Each of the alternatives in the evolution of the state will correspond
to different elementary properties of the quantum system, but the overall
state of the system is a classical disjunction of these alternative states.
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Thus, also in spontaneous collapse theories (as in pilot-wave theory),
the quantum connectives do not provide the basis for the effectiveness of
the classical connectives. There is no story explaining that the cat is dead
or alive classically because it is dead or alive quantum logically. The cat is
first fleetingly (if at all) dead or alive quantum logically, then the dynamics
intervenes and ensures the cat is dead or alive classically. Either a hit on
the dead component takes place or one on the alive component does.
One could say that in spontaneous collapse theories quantum logic is
naturally adapted to describing the kinematics of the theory, but that the
dynamics of the theory requires classical logic. Thus again, although in
spontaneous collapse theories it may be natural to introduce quantum logic
as a (local) logic at the level of the testable propositions, it cannot be taken
as the basis for justifying the everyday use of classical logic. It might claim
a place alongside classical logic, but it cannot replace it.12
7.3 Everett’s many-worlds
The views associated with Everett’s many-worlds are indeed many, and some
versions, such as the idea that the material universe literally multiplies
whenever a measurement occurs, are out of favour for good reason. The
modern version we shall adopt here has been developed over the last fifteen
years, mainly through the work of Saunders (1993), Wallace (2003, 2005)
and Greaves (2004), and nowadays enjoys a broad though admittedly not
universal consensus among philosophers of physics.
The Everett approach is an interpretation of quantum mechanics in the
strict sense, in that it takes the theory without any additions or modifica-
tions. It takes the ontology of quantum mechanics to be given completely
by the wave function (of the universe), but instead of adopting a ‘God’s eye’
perspective on the wave function, it asks what would be an internal perspec-
tive on such a universe. The key insight of the interpretation is that through
the mechanism of decoherence, the wave function develops components that
12More recently, a different way of interpreting spontaneous collapse theories has been
proposed, in terms of matter density (Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti 1995). Analogously to
the case of de Broglie-Bohm theory, regardless of whether this matter density is taken as
the sole ontology of the theory or as a hidden variable additional to an ontological wave
function, the effectiveness of classical logic on the macroscopic scale will again derive from
the applicability of classical logic to this matter density.
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have a stable identity over extremely long periods of time and that are dy-
namically independent of each other. It thus makes sense to identify these
components as quasi-separate ‘worlds’, and to define an internal perspective
as centred on each such world.
When a measurement occurs, each observer develops into generally many
successors, indexed by their different measurement results. So, which mea-
surement result obtains is a matter of perspective: from the perspective of
the live cat, the atom has not decayed and thereby triggered the smashing
of the vial of cyanide; from the perspective of the dead cat, it has.
Further recent work pioneered by Deutsch (1999) and perfected in par-
ticular by Wallace (2005) has sought to justify the use of the usual quantum
probabilities on the basis of rational decision theory as adapted to such a
‘splitting’ agent. If one accepts Lewis’s Principal Principle as the definition
of objective chances, the Deutsch-Wallace results imply that the quantum
probabilities are indeed objective in each world.
What about logic? Note first of all that, from the perspective of each
world, the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics can be applied,
taking the relevant component of the universal wave function to be the
quantum state for that world. Note also that, although the description of a
world given by the relevant component of the wave function is perspectival,
it is no less objective than the description of the universe as given by the
total wave function.
Thus, again from the perspective of each world (which is the only per-
spective that makes sense empirically), quantum logic is well adapted to
describe the intrinsic properties of physical systems. The question, as we
know by now, is whether classical logic is required separately to make sense
of the effectiveness of classical logic on the macroscopic scale, or whether
there is a sense in which quantum logic can explain how classical logic can
be effective in everyday cases, and therefore how we may have arrived to
our classical conception of logic by abstraction from the everyday world.
In the case of the Everett interpretation it now seems that this challenge
is met. Indeed, while in general a quantum disjunction does not behave
truth-functionally (because the different components of the wave function
do not decohere, thus all belong to the same world), there are cases in
which it does (because the different components do decohere and thus be-
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long to different worlds). In such cases, from the perspective of each world,
the disjuncts behave like classical alternatives, one of which is actual, the
others counterfactual. Although in every world the properties of all phys-
ical systems are in bijective correspondence with subspaces of the Hilbert
space, de facto unobserved macroscopic superpositions are not the kind of
properties that appear in a typical world, unlike the case of the standard in-
terpretation. And this is because interference between different components
becomes negligible, and an effective superselection rule arises between the
different non-interfering components, thus mimicking the case of von Neu-
mann algebras discussed in section 6. The relation between the quantum
and the classical connectives is not a formal relation as we had in the case of
von Neumann algebras, but the connectives behave classically in a suitable
physical limit.
Thus, while the structure of the intrinsic properties of physical systems
supports a non-distributive logic at the fundamental level (even in the indi-
vidual worlds), one can claim that, unlike the case of pilot-wave theory or
spontaneous collapse, the perspectival element characteristic of the Everett
interpretation introduces a genuine emergence of the classical connectives
from the quantum connectives. In this sense, it is only the Everett in-
terpretation, among the major approaches to quantum mechanics, that is
compatible with a revision of logic. One is not forced to accept the overall
package, but, while perhaps not entirely as Putnam had articulated it, there
is an intelligible sense in which (standard) quantum mechanics may suggest
that logic be revised.
8 Conclusion
We hope to have clarified in what sense empirical considerations of quantum
phenomena may have a bearing on the issue of the ‘true’ logic. Some of Put-
nam’s (1968) claims in this regard can be justified, but with qualifications.
What can be said about the status of quantum logic in our world, assum-
ing current approaches to the foundations of quantum mechanics, depends
on the details of the chosen approach. In particular, one might justify a
revision of logic at most if one chooses an Everett interpretation. Indeed,
it is a general lesson in the philosophy of physics, confirmed in the present
case, that bold philosophical claims made on the basis of quantum mechan-
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ics turn out to be highly dependent on the interpretational approach one
adopts towards the theory.
The scenario in which consideration of quantum or quantum-like phe-
nomena might make a revision of logic most appealing is possibly that of
von Neumann algebras — thus perhaps vindicating Dickson’s (2001) intu-
ition —, where there is a rigorous sense in which the quantum and classical
connectives can be said to be the same and to behave truth-functionally or
not according to the meaning of the propositions involved. This possibility
is presumably not realised in our world, but whether it is or not is itself an
empirical issue, thus lending at least some support to the idea that logic is
indeed empirical.
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